Is border security racist?

Harry Binswanger writes:

Things are different in wartime, or when an epidemic breaks out in a certain region, of course, but what about peacetime? What about now, when millions of Mexicans, South Americans, Chinese, Canadians, etc. are seeking entry into the U.S.? What about the overwhelming majority, who are not criminals, not terrorists, and not carriers of some plague? By what moral principle can they be inspected, harrassed, or excluded? Majority vote? No single individual has the right to stop another and “inspect” him to see if he is “acceptable,” so no majority—which is simply a number of individuals—has that right either.

In the absence of specific evidence against him, nothing can justify subjecting an immigrant to coercive interference.

I’m very afraid that the actual reason for limiting immigration is xenophobia, which is simply a polite word for racial bigotry.

First of all, when Binswanger says,

No single individual has the right to stop another and “inspect” him to see if he is “acceptable,” so no majority—which is simply a number of individuals—has that right either.

Would he actually carry that through and say that you have no right to prevent anyone from entering your home? Is his position that there should be no screening anywhere for any reason?

Because clearly, if you have the right to stop and inspect someone before they enter your own property and decide if they are acceptable, then a group (simply a number of individuals, as he points out) has such a right as well, as delegated from the individuals.

In the case of a proper limited government, established by contractual agreement amongst all its citizens who delegate their rights, this is precisely the case. This is why, if you do grant the right of the individual to screen the people he allows onto his property, then there must be a right for the country to screen the people it allows across its borders as well, without it being a coercive violation of individual rights. I’ve covered this argument elsewhere.

What I want to focus on here is another part of what he said:

“What about now, when millions of Mexicans, South Americans, Chinese, Canadians, etc. are seeking entry into the U.S.?”

Binswanger is excluding criminals, terrorists, and people with plagues, and he’s specified he’s not talking about granting citizenship or voting rights – he’s just talking about border crossing, doing business, taking up residence, and so on.

The question is, as a country, are there other reasons that we might want to exclude people? Obviously there can be some economic benefit from their business and residence and so on, so what else can this be about – is it just racism?

Judging the people who want to come here

We can come up with a whole list of criteria on which you may want to judge someone before allowing them into your home (or into your community, or into your country), none of which have to do with race:

  • Are they reasonable, rational people?
  • Are they honest?
  • Do they respect individual rights and personal boundaries ?
  • Do they understand the nature of rights and jurisdiction?
  • Do they understand contractual agreements?
  • Do they understand the system of government and laws?
  • Do they have respect for rules and laws?
  • Do they believe in resolving disputes peacefully through communication rather than through violence?
  • Do they reject corruption, bribery, and special treatment?
  • Do they believe in the special value and dignity of human life and property? (I think there’s a serious question as to whether the lack of reverence for the sacredness of human life belies claims of peace and respect for rights)
  • Do they believe in loving and taking care of the people around them, and of their surroundings?
  • Do they have good cultural aesthetic values (cleanliness, politeness, modesty)?
  • Are they benevolent, expecting the best of people, and committed to the presumption of innocence until proven guilty?
  • Do they value hard work?
  • To what extent will they participate in and build up the economy and the community? Do they intend to be fully involved, or will their interests and resources continue to mainly be directed elsewhere?
  • Do they have good taste? (they may not be voting in politics but they are voting in the market and influencing prices and availability of products and direction companies take)
  • Do they speak the language – are they able to communicate clearly with people in the society?
  • Do they have knowledge of the culture and history, including customs and symbols?

And the list goes on. To quote from, Objectivism and an Immigration Policy of Self-Interest for America Today by Dr. Ed Powell:

“Rejection of aggression, long time horizons, self-responsibility, and the recognition of reciprocity lead to productivity, savings, sexual restraint, close family ties, a focus on education, a rejection of welfare benefits, and law-abidingness. These are critical personal characteristics of any intended immigrant to the United States.

Questions abound that we could ask about people entering the country – having nothing to do with race or skin color.

These kinds of judgments about people entering the country are a matter of self-protection and self-interest going beyond just politics or economics. These principles should inform all of your relationship choices. You want people in your life who are honest, hard-working, rights-respecting, effectively-communicating, benevolent, and so on, for friends, neighbors, romantic partners, and employers/employees.

When you are talking about allowing people into your home, your community, your country – places where you not only have the right, but the responsibility to exercise your best and most careful judgment – every consideration about their character, their beliefs, and the potential values and risks that they could bring should be a part of your decision.

Limited Government: A rights-respecting government

“To secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed”

– Thomas Jefferson, The United States Declaration of Independence

Imagine the following: suppose we have a government that is based on voluntary, contractual agreement from its citizens. That is, the citizens agree, voluntarily, and in a signed, written contract, to the structure and function of their government: the legislative body which writes the laws (as well as the elective process by which legislators are chosen), the executive body that enforces the laws, and the court system which interprets the law in individual cases and settles disputes. Furthermore, since all citizens are taking part in this government voluntarily, they can easily decide to withdraw from the agreement by a simple process of legally renouncing their citizenship, and removing themselves from the jurisdiction and protection of the government.

This model, which is called a limited government, is a government based on the consent of the governed. It is formed by people joining together through a voluntary, contractual agreement, with the right to revoke their consent at any time. This form of government maintains absolute and consistent respect for the individual rights of its citizens.

This model of government is analagous to many other contractual agreements with which we interact with the people around us. Take for example a corporation. The corporation doesn’t belong to any individual shareholder personally, but it’s instituted and owned by them all, per the terms of their contractual agreement. You may be an employee or a shareholder in such a corporation yourself right now. Your relationship to the corporation is of course a voluntary relationship: you are free to buy shares and become a shareholder, or sell off your shares and leave the shareholder agreement, or to become an employee or sever your employment at any time.

As long as you do maintain your relationship with this corporation, it is by way of (and under the protection of) written agreement. This written agreement grants you certain rights: if the corporation violates this agreement, they are liable and are accountable for their transgressions (potentially owing you compensation), and will be held legally accountable. This written agreement also specifies the means by which corporate policies are set: usually let’s say by a board of directors. If this board of directors, like a legislature for a government, sets a policy for the company – so long as that policy is made according to the terms set in place in the written agreement it’s made in the first place (like the country’s constitution) – then that becomes the new policy for the company. Fortunately, if you don’t agree with the policy – let’s say it’s one that is going to be harmful to you, personally, either in your stock value or the nature of your job – you are free to simply end your relationship with the company, sell your shares, or quit your job. But so long as you stick with them, that is the policy, and you are agreeing to follow it, even if you don’t like it or find it harmful to you.

In this way, a country governed by limited government can rightfully and legitimately establish policies, like restricting border crossings, or levying a tax, with which its citizens may not even agree, or may even find harmful – and yet, the government imposes nothing involuntary on its citizens, who are free to drop their agreement at any time.

For this reason, it cannot legitimately be said that, inherently, “taxation is theft”, or that there is categorically a right to “the freedom of travel across a country’s borders”. For consenting citizens who take part in a limited government, their taxes are not imposed involuntarily, and restricting border crossings is not without their consent. Even if they disagree with the particular policy or find it harmful, so long as they continue to choose to remain a citizen, their rights are not being violated.

Closed Borders: A rights-based defense

Harry Binswanger of the Ayn Rand Institute has written on the “right to freedom of travel” here. See also his defense of open borders immigration here.

He writes:

“Freedom of travel is a right. It is a right possessed by every human being, not just by Americans. The Mexican government or the French government has no right to stop you from entering Mexico or France, and our government has no right to stop a Mexican or Frenchman from entering America”; or, “The principle of individual rights demands open immigration. Implementing that would mean phasing out all limitations on immigration. Entry into the United States should ultimately be free for any foreigner, absent objective evidence of criminal intent or infectious disease”; or, “Amnesty for illegal immigrants is not enough, they deserve an apology”

All Binswanger seems to see here is that one private individual who happens to be in Mexico, and one private individual who happens to be in America, both seemingly consent to the Mexican traveling onto or across the American’s property. He writes:

“The country does not belong to the government. It does not belong to the majority. Land belongs to individual, private owners, and only they have the right to invite or bar others from coming on their land.”

Essentially his argument is that if you are a citizen who owns property at the border of the country, and you give your permission for some non-citizen to cross the border and come onto your property, then the government has no right to get in the way of this mutually-consented-to interaction. The citizen with property on the border is giving his consent, so the non-citizen should be able to cross un-hindered.

But the American, by virtue of their citizenship, is already in an agreement with the government not to allow foreigners to cross the border: the citizen has an existing contractual agreement to follow immigration and border control law. You can’t claim they are just simply and freely giving their consent to travel – they can’t give that kind of consent freely, as they already have an agreement prohibiting it.

If it wasn’t for their US citizenship, if they didn’t already have this prior commitment to follow the laws of their country, then sure, it would be as simple as freely giving his consent. But that’s not the case. In reality, if he decides to let in a non-citizen, then he is in criminal violation of the law he has agreed to follow as a citizen. Without the citizen being able to give their legal consent to the travel, of course the foreigner has no right to proceed either.

What Binswanger is missing here is that the United States was founded as – or at least a proper government ought to be – a limited government. A limited government is a government based on the consent of the governed. It is formed by people joining together through a voluntary, contractual agreement, with absolute and consistent respect for the individual rights of its citizens.

(Side note – public property is a valid concept under such a limited government model: the government is established by its citizens, and its property is, ultimately, the property of its citizens. It’s like a corporation, which may have capital or cash on hand which doesn’t belong to any individual shareholder personally, but it’s still owned by them all per the terms of their contractual agreement. It’s still private property, and the terms for the use of that property is still entirely under the control of the shareholders – or the citizens in this case.)

If a person can legitimately bar others from entering his own property, then a group of citizens can legitimately form a limited government together wherein they bar foreigners from crossing their borders except through agreed upon channels.

Are the rights of the citizen being violated by such a policy?

The law is of course not being forced upon the citizen under the limited government model. An individual joins and remains a citizen of a limited government voluntarily, and has a say in the process whereby law is made. If his differences are so irreconcilable that he decides he wants to be free from it, then he can terminate his agreement with the government according to the legal mechanism in place: by renouncing his citizenship. This would remove him from the jurisdiction of the government, as well as from it’s protection, and indeed from any legal relationship with its citizens. Returned to the state of nature, he would then be in the simplified situation Binswanger imagined, where the two individuals unencumbered by legal establishment can take their chances with one another.

Finally, one might object that a proper government shouldn’t restrict immigration and border crossing because it’s not a proper defense policy (I will argue against this elsewhere – it is clear, in my mind at least, that border security is absolutely critical for national defense).

We’ve established that in a limited government this policy of restricting border crossing is entirely taking place within a legitimate, voluntary contractual agreement, and so the policy is ultimately being adopted with the consent of the governed. But let’s say a citizen happens to disagree with the policy, and even though he consents to the legal system which enacted it, he feels that the policy is wrong, and every time this policy is enforced that he is being wronged.

Even still, though the policy may be irrational and harmful, you cannot say that his rights are being violated – that’s just not how voluntary contracts work. As a voluntary signatory to the contract, of course he is going to be subject to the terms of his agreement as a citizen of the government, until and unless he chooses to withdraw from the agreement.

Therefore, in any limited government that has legally closed its borders, there is no inherent right to the freedom of travel which allows someone to cross the border.

Introduction to Active Objectivism

“There is a dangerous little catch phrase which advises you to keep an “open mind.” This is a very ambiguous term — as demonstrated by a man who once accused a famous politician of having “a wide open mind.” That term is an anti-concept: it is usually taken to mean an objective, unbiased approach to ideas, but it is used as a call for perpetual skepticism, for holding no firm convictions and granting plausibility to anything. A “closed mind” is usually taken to mean the attitude of a man impervious to ideas, arguments, facts and logic, who clings stubbornly to some mixture of unwarranted assumptions, fashionable catch phrases, tribal prejudices — and emotions. But this is not a “closed” mind, it is a passive one. It is a mind that has dispensed with (or never acquired) the practice of thinking or judging, and feels threatened by any request to consider anything.

What objectivity and the study of philosophy require is not an “open mind,” but an active mind — a mind able and eagerly willing to examine ideas, but to examine them critically. An active mind does not grant equal status to truth and falsehood; it does not remain floating forever in a stagnant vacuum of neutrality and uncertainty; by assuming the responsibility of judgment, it reaches firm convictions and holds to them. Since it is able to prove its convictions, an active mind achieves an unassailable certainty in confrontations with assailants — a certainty untainted by spots of blind faith, approximation, evasion and fear.”

“Philosophical Detection,”
Ayn Rand, Philosophy: Who Needs It?, 21

I want to start by referring largely to the article “Questions and Comments on the Closed System” By Diana Hsieh [2]. Note that her article itself refers largely to another article, “Fact and Value” By Leonard Peikoff [1]. I fully agree with Peikoff’s rejection of “Open Objectivism” as he argues in his article. However, I also reject his counter-position of “Closed Objectivism”, as argued by Diana Hsieh in her article, with some caveats and extensions that I will explain here:

“First, in “Fact and Value,” Peikoff says that the “the essence of the system [of Objectivism]–its fundamental principles and their consequences in every branch–is laid down once and for all by the philosophy’s author.” I wholeheartedly agree with that statement. Contra Kelley, to reject or revise some principles of Objectivism is to depart from Objectivism. The philosophy is not some loose family of views generated within a school of thought, but a specific system developed by a single person. It necessarily includes many principles regarded as derivative and hence optional by Kelley, such as the axiom of consciousness, the virtues of pride, honesty, and integrity, knowledge as hierarchical and contextual, the form/content distinction in perception, the benevolent universe premise, the value of romantic love, the whole of aesthetics, and so much more. In my view, the claim that Objectivism is an open system is not merely wrong, but disastrous as implemented in both academics and activism at TOC.”

I do of course agree with Hsieh that “The philosophy is not some loose family of views generated within a school of thought”, and also that the philosophy of Objectivism happened to have been largely developed initially by one person. I also further agree that the essence of the philosophy cannot ever be contradicted and the result still be referred to as “Objectivism”. And I also further agree that the positions of Ayn Rand on many of the derivative principles of Objectivism are integral and non-optional. However, and here is where I make a caveat to my agreement with Hsieh’s article, I strongly disagree with the statement in general that, “…their consequences in every branch–is laid down once and for all by the philosophy’s author”. She continues in the next paragraph:

“I also agree with Peikoff that “if anyone wants to reject Ayn Rand’s ideas and invent a new viewpoint, he is free to do so–but he cannot, as a matter of honesty, label his new ideas or himself ‘Objectivist’.””

My main contention here is that only disagreement on the essence of the idea, or any idea soundly derived from that essence, disqualifies an idea from being “Objectivist”. If it so happens that one of the derivative ideas, even if advocated by Ayn Rand herself, is in fact in contradiction to the whole essence of the philosophy she set out to define, and someone comes along later to straighten that point out, their fix is rightfully part of Objectivism, and not something separate.

It is important here for me to point out that I am not advocating any unusual notion of “the essence of Objectivism”. Ayn Rand was once asked to explain the fundamentals of Objectivism standing on one foot. Her response was as follows [3]:

1. Metaphysics: Objective Reality.

2. Epistemology: Reason.

3. Ethics: Self-Interest.

4. Politics: Laissez-Faire Capitalism.

However, it is also important to point out here a distinction between the essence of an idea, as contrasted with a set of fundamentals. The essence of an idea is singular, it can’t be a list of things, like some set of positions which make up some abstract particular. An essence is never a collection. The essence of Objectivism, I would say, is simply the philosophy of being objective. That is, having respect for reality, truth, logic, beauty, the good, and so on, and not to compromise or sacrifice these things for any reason. This is the essence or nature of the philosophy Ayn Rand set out to define, and any of her derivative positions, even some of the fundamental tenets of her metaphysical or epistemological philosophy, if they are found to be in contradiction to the basic idea of her philosophy – objectivity – then they ought to be corrected as well.

I am more or less in full agreement with the remainder of Hsieh’s article, where she proceeds to illuminate all of the undesirable consequences of taking a “closed system” position on Objectivism:

“So my question is really whether such is its only possible meaning. In other words, are there contexts in which a slightly broader term — one which includes later philosophic developments deeply and thoroughly consistent with the core principles of Objectivism — would be appropriate? From my perspective, it seems that Objectivists, including advocates of the closed system, appeal to this broader meaning rather frequently — and rightfully so. For example:

  • Objectivists commonly claim that “the Objectivist view on X is Y,” even though Y is a later application of the core principles established by Ayn Rand rather than one of those principles themselves. So if an analytic philosopher invents some new object allegedly demanding our sacrifice (such as bacteria, alien invaders, or household pets), we would not be shocked or dismayed to hear Objectivist scholars say that Objectivism rejects that view entirely, even though such a rejection is, strictly speaking, an application of the general Objectivist view on self-sacrifice to this new case.

  • As far as I recall, Leonard Peikoff’s lecture course, “Objectivism: The State of the Art,” primarily concerns material he learned while writing Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand. On the strict and narrow meaning of “Objectivism,” this title seems baffling to me. How could such material fall under the title “Objectivism”? How could Objectivism have a “state of the art” after Ayn Rand’s death? Yet such is perfectly comprehensible under a slightly broader meaning of the term.

  • In his excellent course Understanding Objectivism, Peikoff breaks new ground in his detailed discussions of the rationalist and empiricist methodologies, particularly their relationship to the mind-body dichotomy. Such elaboration upon and integrations of already-established Objectivist principles are apparently not part of Objectivism, narrowly construed. Yet the deep connection to Objectivism is undeniable. One of the primary values of such work is that it provides us with the means to substantially enrich our concepts, e.g. those of rationalism, empiricism, and the mind-body dichotomy. Since such concepts refer to all that we might ever learn about their referents and such concepts compose various principles of Objectivism, in what sense can Objectivism exclude such new insights? We might think of many such insights as implicit in the system and thus part of it, even if not explicitly identified until after Ayn Rand’s death.

  • In Ayn Rand’s writings, some principles of Objectivism were merely asserted, but not explained or justified. For example, she claims that reason, purpose, and self-esteem are the cardinal values, but does not tell us what that means or why that is. Without a good explanation of the meaning and justification of this claim, it stands alone, without any connection to the rest of the system. When a good, deeply Objectivist explanation and justification is offered, should we continue to allow those cardinal values to stand outside the system? Or should we integrate them by incorporating this new understanding into our understanding of Objectivism? The latter seems like the right approach to me, but it also seems incompatible with the strictly closed system.”

The only thing I would add to her outstanding argument is to stress that a broader notion of Objectivism does not merely include “new implications, applications, integrations”, but corrections as well, under the strict condition that those corrections maintain complete logical fidelity to the essence of the philosophy.

Finally, one of Hsieh’s comments on the epistemology of the “closed system” position in particular deserves special attention:

“In any case, unit economy seems to demand a single word to designate the philosophy developed by Ayn Rand plus the valid and consistent “new implications, applications, integrations” of that philosophy.”

In fact, the following quote from Ayn Rand cuts to the core of the issue and explains why the “closed system” position is truly a grave epistemological error:

“None of the traditional theories of concepts regards concepts as objective, i.e., as neither revealed nor invented, but as produced by man’s consciousness in accordance with the facts of reality, as mental integrations of factual data computed by man — as the products of a cognitive method of classification whose processes must be performed by man, but whose content is dictated by reality.” [4] (ITOE p. 54)

As Kelley correctly argues [5]:

This brings us to a final argument for Objectivism as a closed system, an argument that lies close to the surface in Peikoff’s essay, and has been put forward explicitly by some Objectivists. The argument is that Ayn Rand’s relationship to the philosophy is the same as her relationship to her literary works: she is the author of Objectivism in the same sense that she is the author of Atlas Shrugged. She is accordingly free to stipulate the content of the term. Objectivism includes all and only the philosophical doctrines she embraced, and the system was closed with her death. No one may add to these doctrines, or abandon or revise any of them, and still call himself an Objectivist—just as no one can alter the content of her novels. The attempt to do so, some might add, is like the efforts of the mediocrities in The Fountainhead who claimed the right to disfigure Roark’s buildings.

This view is radically mistaken. A literary work is a creation, the concrete embodiment of an idea by a specific author. A philosophy, by contrast, is a body of theoretical knowledge about reality. That is why, as Ayn Rand herself pointed out, a philosophical discovery cannot be copyrighted. [6] The discovery itself, as distinct from a specific text in which it is conveyed, is not the property of the discoverer. Property must be concrete, but a philosophy is a viewpoint that may be held by an open-ended number of people. Moreover, as a body of knowledge, a grasp of certain facts in reality, its content is determined by the nature of those facts, including their relationships and implications, not by anyone’s stipulation. Had Ayn Rand omitted the character of Francisco D’Anconia from Atlas Shrugged, no one would be free to invent that character and rewrite the novel without her permission, even if such a revision would represent an improvement. But had she died before she discovered that rights may be violated only by physical force, and had someone else discovered this principle, it would have to be included in Objectivism. The system demands it; the issue of who discovered it is irrelevant.

In light of Peikoff’s excellent rejection of Kelley’s “Open Objectivism”, and Hsieh’s and Kelley’s excellent rejection of Peikoff’s “Closed Objectivism”, I offer up a third alternative which I think carries on the noble tradition of Objectivism in dissolving false alternatives, namely the idea of Active Objectivism.

Active Objectivism is the recognition that any idea that disagrees with the essence or nature of the philosophy of Objectivism, or any idea soundly derived from that essence, is disqualified from being “Objectivist”, but also that the philosophy of Objectivism, while having been largely initially developed by Ayn Rand, must nevertheless be regarded as an objective concept, i.e., as neither revealed nor invented, but as produced by man’s consciousness in accordance with the facts of reality, and as such, it includes all yet-to-be-discovered new characteristics including implications, applications, integrations, and corrections, under the strict condition that those new characteristics maintain complete logical fidelity to essence of the philosophy.

[1] FACT AND VALUE By Leonard Peikoff, Ph.D. from The Intellectual Activist, Volume V, Number 1

[2] Questions and Comments on the Closed System By Diana Hsieh WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 2004

[3] Introducing Objectivism by Ayn Rand

[4] Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology by Ayn Rand

[5] Objectivism, Chapter 5 of Truth and Toleration by David Kelley–40-Objectivism_Chapter_5_Truth_Toleration.aspx

[6] “Patents and Copyrights,” in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal by Ayn Rand (New York: New American Library, 1967) p. 22.